1 Every person, organization, agency, and state is involved in voluntary relationships that present the possibility for mutual gain at the risk of betrayal. To cement these relationships, formal and informal institutions can allow individuals to build reputations and to select transaction partners carefully. These reputational mechanisms provide incentives for individuals to behave in a trustworthy manner by making future opportunities contingent on present choices.
While formal models have demonstrated the possibility that reputation can enhance cooperation (e.g., Raub and Weesie 1990; Kandori 1992) , less is known about how different reputational institutions condition the effect of reputation on cooperative outcomes. In particular, we do not know when central, top-down information clearinghouses will outperform local, self-organizing, bottom-up systems. Can the Better Business Bureau do a better job of enforcing consumer rights than word-of-mouth (Grinnell 1931 (Greif 1989; Maggi 1999) ? Would information clearinghouses decrease rampant business fraud better than reputations developed by personal networks in newly emerging markets (Radaev 2004) ? Can blogs about the academic job market in political science (http://irrumormill.blogspot.com/) provide a stronger reputation effect than traditional word-ofmouth?
Our analysis of central and local reputation mechanisms focuses on the incentives to provide, request, and use the information that is critical to any reputational system. If providing information is voluntary, individuals face the temptation to free ride by using the information provided by others without bothering to report their own experiences. Thus, although reputation mechanisms can help resolve strategic dilemmas that prevent cooperation and broader exchanges, the solution itself involves an additional information provision dilemma.
We argue that the relative performance of reputation mechanisms depends on their ability to resolve this information provision dilemma. Local mechanisms that provide word-ofmouth information through endogenously created networks can create strong incentives to provide honest reputation information by embedding information exchange in ongoing relationships of mutual cooperation. But by limiting information exchange to close associates, these mechanisms spread information slowly and hence slow the evolution of cooperation and expansion of exchange. Central mechanisms can make information available to much wider audiences, but may offer weak incentives to motivate full and honest reporting.
We test the performance of these reputation mechanisms with a laboratory experiment that compares the level of cooperation achieved with central and local information-sharing mechanisms against a baseline condition that allows no sharing of information. The control afforded by a laboratory environment allows us to examine each institution in isolation to observe information provision and its causal impact on cooperation.
REPUTATION, COOPERATION AND INFORMATION PROVISION
In two-person repeated prisoner's dilemmas, direct past experience allows a player to establish a reputation with the partner that can support mutual cooperation. Cooperation provides an expensive signal that is rational to send in a wide variety of environments (Friedman 1971; Taylor 1976; Rubinstein 1979; Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) , even including the finitelyrepeated dilemma (Kreps et al. 1982) , as long as the likelihood that the partner will cooperate conditionally is sufficient. The power of what we call experiential reputation has been validated in a number of experiments (Andreoni and Miller 1993; Dal Bo 2005) and evolutionary studies of cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Boyd and Lorberbaum 1987; Lorberbaum 1994; Bendor and Swistak 1997) .
The reputation literature generally focuses on informational reputation in which information from one game influences others playing other games, thereby constraining behavior in anticipation of future reputational effects. For example, both Boyd and Richerson (1989) and Nowak and Sigmund (1998) have proposed models of indirect reciprocity in an environment of randomly mixed pairwise encounters. In these models, cooperative outcomes are sustained by making cooperation with a present partner contingent on that partner's cooperation with his/her previous partners. These indirectly reciprocal strategies can be evolutionarily stable, even if individuals never meet more than once, as long as information about a player's past follows him into future encounters with new partners. Related studies by Kandori (1992) and Janssen (2006) model information-sharing in terms of labels or symbols that are imperfect but reliable, and illustrate that shared information can support cooperative outcomes by triggering punishment for defection.
Most directly relevant to our experiment is the analysis by Raub and Weesie (1990) of repeated 2-person dilemmas among neighbors embedded in a fixed spatial grid. They demonstrate that the range of payoffs capable of sustaining cooperative equilibria increases with the number of the partner's other games that are reported to the player and with the accuracy of information. They suggest that further studies need to investigate alternative systems that provide information beyond local partners and in particular the "incentive problems associated with the supply of information" (Raub and Wessie 1990: 648) .
In order to consider alternative reputational systems and the resultant incentive problems, our experiments move beyond the available theoretical results to incorporate three relatively novel features we believe to be critical for understanding the influence of reputation systems operating in all realms of institutional life: voluntary exchange relationships, voluntary information provision, and alternative information exchange mechanisms.
Voluntary exchange relationships. Most people are involved not in fixed games between prisoners who cannot exit the relationship, but rather in a range of ongoing voluntary interactions with selected partners (Tullock 1985) . We therefore move beyond the one-shot or repeated prisoner's dilemma framework of past models to consider individuals who may repeatedly encounter each other in two-person dilemma-type exchanges, but are free to select their partners and to terminate unsatisfactory relationships. As previous experiments have observed, the addition of an exit option can substantially enhance the benefits of cooperation and constrain defectors by denying future payoffs to them (Orbell and Dawes 1993; Boone and Macy 1999) . Ule (2006) found that cooperation levels were much higher in all experimental conditions allowing selection than in comparable conditions with fixed partners, especially when subjects had full information of outcomes and the cost of excluding defectors was low.
The power of reputation in voluntary exchange relationships extends beyond the betterknown punishment-oriented behavioral constraints because selection advantages further enhance the benefit of a good reputation. If reliable new business partners can be found via recommendations from trusted associates, a good reputation creates new and beneficial exchanges. Exploiting current partners not only damages currently ongoing games, but also limits future opportunities with other players. In other words, the advantage for conditional cooperators increases if reputational information reduces the risks involved in seeking additional partners. This first extension of the literature is particularly important for reputation studies, because reputation could operate primarily through selection and termination decisions rather than through behavioral modification within ongoing games.
Voluntary information provision. Unlike the models referenced above, most real-world reputation mechanisms are based on voluntary provision of information about others' behavior.
Individuals can often choose whether or not to complain about bad behavior or report good behavior, as is the case with the Better Business Bureau, eBay, product reviews on the internet, informal recommendations from friends, and so on. In these environments, a successful reputation mechanism must motivate agents to report accurate information despite the temptation to free-ride on the reporting of others. Thus reputation mechanisms must resolve an information provision dilemma in order to mitigate the original exchange dilemmas.
Alternative information exchange mechanisms. Most previous models seek generality and tractability by abstracting away the details of how information is actually exchanged. Our goal of comparing central and local reputational mechanisms, on the other hand, requires a clear specification of the different means of seeking and providing information in each. Our third extension of the literature compares two alternative informational reputation systems with a baseline condition dependent only on experiential reputation. One system represents local, selforganizing networks of information sharing associated with the social capital perspective (Granovetter 1985; Coleman 1987; Putnam 1993 ) and the bottom-up approach to organization (e.g., Bianco and Bates 1990; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1992; Bohnet et al. 2001) . The other represents the top-down, central information distribution institutions whose broader scope can potentially enhance performance by allowing information to flow freely to anyone who seeks it, whether or not they know the information provider.
Our research design replicates one critical distinction between these paradigmatic systems with critical consequences for information provision. When buyers use a local mechanism they generally seek information from a friend who can recommend a seller that the buyer may not even know; when buyers use a central mechanism like the internet they can generally request information about a particular seller and see the comments posted by previous buyers that the buyer is unlikely to know. The local reputation mechanism we model allows an information seeker to choose the source (or the provider) of information from among her group of associates, which restricts information to the scope of the source's relationships. By contrast, the central reputation mechanism allows an information seeker to choose any target of reputational information from a common reputation repository and receive all available information about that target. Therefore, the information provision dilemma is a 2-person dilemma in the local condition and an n-person dilemma in the central condition.
Information Provision Incentives Determine Performance
We conjecture that the performance of any reputation mechanism relying on voluntary information provision depends critically on the incentives for providing information. Accurate information can potentially be useful for providing credible commitments and for determining the trustworthiness of current and prospective partners, but why should anyone provide such information to others if it is costly to do so? It takes time and effort to provide accurate feedback on eBay, to report malfeasance to the Better Business Bureau, or to introduce a reliable plumber or gardener to a neighbor. What if a recommended lawyer turns out to be incompetent or untrustworthy, thereby hurting the reputation of the information provider? Vengeance may provide a stronger incentive to report bad behavior, but the risk of retaliation may offset these psychological benefits. So why not free ride by taking advantage of the information others provide but not taking the time and risk of providing information? For a reputation mechanism to work, individuals who can collectively benefit from the mechanism must overcome this secondlevel collective action problem of information provision.
The local and central mechanisms differ substantially in the potential incentives they provide, although both have means of minimizing the costs of information provision. Local interactions may reduce the costs of information transmission in the form of gossip, which requires no organizing structure and is valued in its own right. Yet information moves slowly through such a system, constrained as it is to pass through an incomplete and decentralized network. Central interactions, on the other hand, may reduce costs by simplifying the reporting process and communicating reports to all interested inquirers. Internet exchanges, for example, provide quick-access links, email reminders, and preset forms with standardized reporting tools that make feedback about the buyer's experience relatively easy to post and easy for other prospective buyers to find. Yet centralized systems rely on a costly infrastructure, and on the willingness of strangers to share their experiences.
The main differences in incentives arise from the more intimate relationship between information seekers and providers in the local system. Local reputation systems can use the more intimate relationship between information seekers and providers to punish free riders who do not provide recommendations. One party to an ongoing exchange can ask the partner for recommendations about that partner's partners, and will know if the partner does not respond.
Non-responding partners can be punished by non-cooperation or termination of the exchange, which is not really a costly punishment if the nonresponse calls the partner's trustworthiness into question. Providing misleading information may also lead to future punishment or termination, although the potential for punishment here depends on the ability to detect misinformation. One plausible strategy capable of supporting a cooperative equilibrium under the local reputation mechanism would be an extension of the well-known nice but vengeful strategy that would always ask for recommendations, always provide truthful information when asked, and cease to play with anyone who either defects, gets a bad recommendation, or fails to provide a recommendation.
The link between information provision and cooperation is weaker in the central condition, where the request and provision of recommendations is mediated by a passive central information distribution system. Central systems tend to rely on relatively anonymous reports, in part to minimize concerns about retaliation in response to negative reports.
1 Information seekers and providers both act anonymously, so providers do not know whether others will seek their information, and anonymous free-riders face little threat of retaliation for providing insufficient or incorrect information. Because reporting requires effort but creates no direct benefit to the subject herself and no clear benefits even to cooperating partners, a self-interested person will not contribute. Vengeful subjects may provide negative recommendations to punish defectors, but can negative recommendations alone support reputation-induced cooperation (Standifir
2001)?
In theory at least, free riders could be deterred in the central condition if all cooperation were conditional on some minimal level of information reporting by everyone. However, the need to punish everyone in this n-person game for the lapses of a few free riders makes such a strategy much less plausible than strategies in the local condition that can directly punish individual free riders in the 2-person game, particularly in uncertain and noisy environments in which a plausible minimum level of reporting would be difficult to set. Furthermore, such trigger strategies may actually reduce cooperation to lower levels than in the baseline condition if the observed initial reporting falls below the expectations of subjects following such strategies.
Free-riding might more plausibly be reduced if some critical proportion of the population had an internalized incentive to report-after all, successful internet rating sites do provide reports from substantial numbers of buyers willing to assess sellers and products. For example, the critical population might support a reciprocating norm that would require honest reporting from those who use and identify with the system. Some proportion of free-riders could be tolerated in such a system as long as the proportion of normatively motivated participants could provide sufficient information to establish credible reputations.
Our experiments are designed to test the conjecture that the ability of each reputation mechanism to enhance cooperation depends on its ability to overcome its characteristic information provision problem. The central mechanism has a natural advantage in that information once provided can be disseminated widely in comparison with the local mechanism, where only existing partners have access to recommendations. The local mechanism, on the other hand, has the advantage of more intimate relationships between information seekers and providers that may more effectively limit the critical free-rider problem of information provision.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To capture the critical dimension of voluntary exchange, our experiment represents the basic exchange dilemma with a 2-person prisoner's dilemma (PD) game; like the real-world interactions that we hope to represent, the PD allows for mutual gain at the risk of exploitation.
Payoffs in the PD are set at 0, 25, 75, and 100 in Experimental Currency Units (400 ECUs=$1.00). Mutual cooperation (payoff = 75) provides a substantial advantage over mutual defection (payoff = 25), although the choices were presented to subjects as alternatives A and B rather than as "cooperate" and "defect."
To represent ongoing voluntary exchanges in our experimental sessions, the 14 subjects in each session know that they can simultaneously propose to play with as many specific partners as they wish in each of 20 periods. However, the PD game only takes place if both partners propose each other at the beginning of a given period (cf. Ule 2006) . 2 Thus, either player can terminate an existing relationship unilaterally simply by not proposing to play in the next period, so any player can ensure no further games will be played if a partner turns out to be undesirable.
To reflect bounded rationality limitations on the number of exchanges individuals are able to manage, subjects pay a cost per game that increases with the number of games played in a given period. 3 Our payoff structure sets two important benchmarks that illustrate the potential cooperators' advantage. A rational player expecting all others to always defect should optimally play four games in each period and always defect, earning a net payoff of 60.4 ECU's per period after subtracting maintenance costs of 39.6 for four games from the 100 ECU payoffs for four games with mutual defection. On the other hand, for the conditional cooperator who expects others to cooperate, the mutual cooperation payoff of 75 per game implies an optimum of 10 games, providing the socially optimal benchmark net payoff of 393.6 ECU's per period. The social optimum payoff is more than six times as large as the defectors' optimum benchmark prediction, leaving much room for variation between the two. By comparing the proportion of cooperation and mutual cooperation, the number of exchanges, and the average payoffs achieved under different reputation mechanisms, we can compare the social welfare achieved under each reputation mechanism.
In the Baseline Condition, subjects gain information about other subjects only from their own experience. To reinforce the experiential reputation effect, at the beginning of each period (after the first) each subject sees only her own experiences (her proposals, proposals from others to her and PD outcomes when games take place with her) with each of the 13 other subjects for up to the past four periods of play. 4 After viewing this information, all players make proposals of whom to play in the current period without knowing whether others will propose them in return or not. Each player plays the resultant PD games with all the proposed players who had also proposed to that player, and the experiment proceeds to the next period once all games are finished.
The other two conditions are the same as the baseline condition except that subjects may provide a positive or negative recommendation about any partner after each PD game. To represent the voluntary feature of reputation mechanisms discussed above, subjects are not required to give recommendations, and the recommendations can be misleading (i.e., subjects can recommend defectors positively and cooperators negatively). As noted above, the process of seeking and making recommendations differs significantly in the remaining conditions.
In the Local Information Condition, a player can ask any current partner for recommendations before choosing new partners. The partner making recommendations is told who if anyone has asked for recommendations, and can then make positive or negative recommendations about any number of his or her current partners. The requesting player then sees the recommendations, and proceeds to the choice of partners with this information available.
In this condition, the flow of information depends on the endogenous pattern of PD relationships created by the subjects.
In the Central Information Condition, after finishing all games in a given period subjects can post positive or negative recommendations about any number of their partners to an information board. These recommendations are then available to any other subject in the experiment who requests them. Subjects can request to see the number of positive and negative recommendations posted by others for any other subject during each of the past four periods, and can do so for as many subjects as they want. The number of posted recommendations is not known before the request is made, and no information is available about who made the recommendations. After this chance to see recommendations, subjects proceed to the next period in which they again propose partners, play the PD games, and make and request recommendations.
We later added a variant Central Truthful Condition that eliminates the information provision dilemma by simply reporting truthfully all information about the PD choices for each specific player to anyone who requests this information. Requesters still need to request information for specific players, but they know that they will receive full information about the number of A or B choices made by each of the specified players in each of the previous four periods.
In all information conditions, recommendations are included in the information screen described for the baseline condition. To encourage the subjects to think about their decision to provide and obtain information rather than always providing and obtaining everything, both requesting and providing recommendations impose a very minor cost of 1 ECU per request or recommendation. 5 In the local condition, requests are charged for each partner from whom requests are solicited, while in both central conditions requests are charged for each subject whose recommendations from others is sought.
A total of 14 sessions were run, four sessions for each of the three initial conditions plus two additional sessions for the central truthful condition. The 196 subjects recruited from social science courses at Florida State University earned performance-based payoffs averaging $20-$25
for sessions that lasted from 60 to 90 minutes. A sample of computer screens, instructions, and other details of the experimental procedures are provided in the Internet Appendix.
RESULTS: LOCAL REPUTATION CONDITION OUTPERFORMS OTHERS
The four graphs in Figure 1 report average performance per subject on four related measures of social welfare for each of the three experimental conditions. Each measure captures a slightly different aspect of performance, but all tell the same story. As expected, informational reputation does outperform experiential reputation, but only for the local condition. More surprisingly, the central condition if anything does worse than the baseline condition. We will first present these results in greater detail, and then analyze information provision patterns to explain them.
The percentages of cooperation (upper-left graph) in all conditions considerably exceed the one-period Nash equilibrium of zero cooperation. The observed level of cooperation is on the upper end of the range of other experiments with dilemmas, and remains relatively stable until the expected decline in the last periods. As anticipated (Ule 2006) , the ability of subjects to select partners and exit from unsatisfactory relationships apparently sustains high levels of cooperation even in the baseline condition with no information provided by other players.
Comparing the results across treatments, the local treatment produces considerably higher levels of cooperation than the baseline in every period, while the central treatment produces lower results. Averaged across all periods, local provision produces 15 percentage points more cooperation than the baseline condition, a difference that is significant even with a conservative test 6 (t=2.09). Central provision, on the other hand, produces on average ten percentage points less cooperation than the baseline across all periods, although the difference is not significant (t=-1.0).
The lower left graph in Figure 1 reports the average number of games with mutually cooperative outcomes (CC) per person, which reflects the ability of cooperators to find reciprocally cooperative relationships. Mutual cooperation increases in the first half of the periods for all conditions even though the percentage of cooperation appears to be stable or decreasing, suggesting that cooperators become better matched over time under all conditions.
The local condition produces more CC outcomes in every period compared with the baseline condition, with significant differences (t>1.96) in periods 10-17. Again, central provision falls below the baseline both overall and in every period, although the differences are not significant.
In all conditions, the average number of games played per person (lower right graph) is closer to the benchmark of four mutual defection games than to the socially optimal benchmark of ten mutual cooperation games. The local condition has a higher number of games in every period and a significantly (t>1.96) higher number in nine of the periods, but the average across all periods of 4.9 is still closer to the lower than the upper benchmark. The factor that limits the number of games is evident in the previous graph, which indicates that on average only three games with mutual cooperation could be achieved even in the best-performing local condition.
The upper right graph reports the primary welfare measure of average earnings in experimental units (ECUs), subtracting the maintenance cost from the total earnings in games played. These results confirm the enhanced overall efficiency of the local condition in extracting resources in comparison to the other conditions. Average earnings were higher than the baseline for local (140 vs. 184, t =2.30 ) and lower than the baseline for central (140 vs. 115, t=0.38) across all periods, with the same relationship in every period. Yet again, even the highest earnings of 210 in later periods of the local condition were far below the socially optimal level of 393.6 ECU's per subject.
In sum, the local outperforms the central and baseline conditions on all measures, while the central condition unexpectedly performs no better than the baseline. The improved performance of the local condition demonstrates that reputational information can clearly enhance outcomes in our social dilemma, and suggests that this implementation of the local reputation mechanism at least partially resolves the information provision dilemma. At the same time, the poor performance of the central condition suggests that our implementation completely failed to resolve the information dilemma. We next analyze differences in information provision and its relationship to overall performance of each mechanism. Vengeance, on the other hand, appears to motivate subjects equally in both conditions:
Subjects in Local Condition Provide More Information
cooperative subjects give negative recommendations about a defector after 28% of games with CD outcomes in the local condition and after 24% in the central condition. Thus evidence does not support a greater frequency of the cooperators' revenge strategies in the central condition,
where it might have played a greater role in motivating provision. In sum, subjects in the local condition supply considerably more information than those in the central condition, with the greatest difference in the category of supporting a partner after a mutually cooperative outcome.
Finally, the table shows that both information conditions prompt relatively truthful reporting: positive recommendations are given for cooperators and negative recommendations for defectors 95% of the time in the local condition and 91% in the central condition.
Apparently, the incentives for strategic misrepresentation are equally low in both conditions, despite the greater incentive for truthful reporting because of the more intimate relationship between seekers and providers in the local condition.
Subjects in Local Condition Request More Information
Requests for information are more difficult to compare across conditions, because subjects in the local condition request recommendations from a partner about unknown others, while in the central condition they retrieve recommendations about a specific target, whether a current or potential future partner, from unknown others. A single request in the local condition may produce recommendations from the selected source about several potential partners, while in the central condition the request may produce recommendations from multiple recommenders about the single selected target. Table 2 reports the number of requests following each possible outcome in the previous period. For the central condition, the outcome is reported between the information requestor and the target of the requested information, so it reveals who the requestor is interested in. For the local condition the outcome is with the partner from whom information is being requested, so it reveals who the subject thinks has the best information.
Subjects in the local condition request information 1162 times compared with 1028 in the central condition. Since the opportunity to request is limited by the subject's number of partners in the local conditions, requests are made in 20% of all opportunities in the local condition, compared with only 7% of the unrestricted opportunities in the central condition. Since the number of recommendations provided is considerably greater in the local condition, as noted above, the average number of recommendations provided per request is also greater.
Perhaps the most striking result in Table 2 is that 78% of all requests by local subjects are made to mutually cooperative partners, again confirming the strong relationship between cooperation in the initial and informational dilemmas that was already evident in the provision of information. Requests are made after one third of all mutual cooperation outcomes, with a higher request frequency in earlier periods as shown in Figure 2 . Equally noteworthy is the fact that 66% of all requests by central subjects inquire about potential partners who had not played with the subject in the previous period. Only 6% of all requests are inquiries from a cooperator about a partner who defected, where the cooperator might seek confirmation from others about the trustworthiness of the defector. That is, information requests in the central condition appear predominantly to be used to search for new partners rather than to check up on existing partners, consistent with an extended trigger strategy that immediately drops defectors without checking for additional information.
Recommendations Affect Partner Selection in Both Conditions
Since comparing requests is difficult because they have different meanings in the two conditions, the critical comparison is whether the requested recommendations actually have an impact on the selection of partners and on the likelihood of cooperation in either condition. Table 3 reports estimation of the impact of recommendations on the decision to propose play with a given partner. No proposal from either subject provides the excluded baseline category, and the remaining six outcomes listed in Table 3 are labeled from the perspective of the subject (ego) whose decision is being analyzed. For example, if the other player (alter) proposed four periods ago when ego did not, then both players proposed and mutually cooperated in the next three periods, Alter proposed would equal 1, Reward (CC) would equal 3, and the remaining variables would equal zero for the dyad in the current period.
To reflect the increasing cost per game as more games are added, we include a quadratic representation of the number of games played by the subject in the last period. Finally, we include Period to account for any trends over time and a Final period dummy to account for the endgame effect. Table 3 indicates that recommendations significantly affect the proposals to play for subjects in both local and central conditions, although the negative effects are considerably larger in the local condition. With all variables at their mean, we calculated the overall average probability of proposing to be 66% in the local condition and 54% in the central condition. Past experiences have very similar effects in all conditions, suggesting that the basic strategies changed little with respect to personal experience even when recommendations were available. All past conditions increase the probability of a proposal over the omitted category that signifies no contacts, indicating some inertia in all links. 8 In all conditions, the reward payoff for mutual cooperation provides the greatest increase in probability, followed by the temptation and punishment payoff and the statistically insignificant sucker payoff.
With other variables at their mean value, one additional period of mutual cooperation increases the likelihood of a renewed proposal by 33% and 29% respectively in the local and 
Positive Recommendations Increase Cooperation Mainly in Local Condition
The impact of recommendations on cooperation is potentially more critical than the impact on partner selection for the success of a reputation mechanism. Table 4 presents the logistic regression results for the dyadic cooperation variable that equals 1 when the subject cooperates, 0 when the subject defects, and is undefined when no game is played. Because the data is censored by the proposal process that determines when a game is played, we use a
Heckman procedure with a first-stage selection equation analyzing the joint probability of proposing, based on a similar set of variables as reported in Table 3 . The test of independence of selection and cooperation supports the need to include the selection equation (p<.0002), although we do not report the selection equation in Table 4 since findings for the joint probability just
repeat Table 3 analysis in a less interpretable way.
9 Table 4 reports a difference in the use of recommendations across conditions: positive recommendations have a strong, positive impact on cooperation in the local but a lesser effect in the central condition. In the local treatment, positive recommendations have a strong, statistically significant influence on cooperation (t=5.55); with all other variables at their means, an increase from 0 positive recommendations to 1 causes a 13.2 percentage point increase in the probability of cooperation. In the central treatment, the effect of positive recommendations is less statistically significant (t=1.85), and the same one-unit increase causes only a 2.7 percentage point increase in the probability of cooperation. This effect remains even after adjustments for the selection effect in which highly-recommended players are more likely to receive proposals and presumably play more games. Negative recommendations have no significant effect in either condition; the only observable punishment strategy appears to operate by refusing to play, not by defecting, and even the refusal to play appears to be marginal in the central condition.
As with proposals, past outcomes have similar impacts on cooperation across all conditions, although here only reward payoffs significantly increase the likelihood of cooperation. Temptation and punishment outcomes significantly decrease the likelihood of cooperation, with punishment having the largest negative impact in each condition. The sucker's payoff has no significant effect, perhaps in part because the likelihood of continuing a relationship is lowest for this outcome.
The significant impacts of both positive recommendations and reward outcomes in the local condition provide additional evidence that information provision is intertwined with game strategy as a means of maintaining cooperative relationships. Even controlling for past mutual cooperation, recommendations from a trusted partner provide additional incentives to cooperate.
This result is particularly striking given the more dominant impact of negative rather than positive recommendations on final bid price in eBay auctions (Standifird 200) , and the pervasive finding that " [b] ad reputations are easy to acquire but difficult to lose, whereas good reputations are difficult to acquire but easy to lose" (Baumeister et al 2001: 344) . Avoiding known evils appears to be the dominant motivation in larger, more anonymous settings, whereas finding trustworthy partners seems to be the dominant motivation for providing and using information when local exchange relations provide the means to obtain recommendations.
Taken as a whole, the results support the argument that the local condition resolves the information provision dilemma better than does the central condition. Information is apparently used in the central condition primarily to find cooperative partners, since most requests are targeted at new potential partners. But the relatively low provision of information is apparently not sufficient to boost levels of cooperation, since positive recommendations induce only a slightly greater propensity to cooperate. Indeed, the sparse information provided in the central condition may itself trigger a less cooperative approach by subjects who provide recommendations but are disappointed when others fail to do so. The failure to even match the performance of the baseline condition underscores the argument that inadequately-designed reputation systems may actually decrease levels of cooperation (cf. Grinnell 1931) .
The local condition, on the other hand, achieves higher levels of information provision, particularly for dyads experiencing mutual cooperation. Both positive and negative recommendations from one's partner affect partner selection. Positive recommendations from one partner directly affect cooperation with other partners as well, further reinforcing cooperation within the overlapping networks of mutual cooperation. Of course, the local condition performance still falls far short of the social optimum benchmark. This sub-optimal performance, combined with the very poor performance of the central condition, raises the question of whether complete elimination of the information provision dilemma is necessary to achieve optimal performance.
Can an Omniscient Agency Do Better?
To test the potential advantage of central reputation mechanisms that do not depend on voluntary information reporting, we ran two additional sessions in which full information was provided to subjects. Subjects in this "central truthful condition" can request to see the number of A and B choices of any other player in the past four periods, so subjects know exactly what kind of information to expect.
The performance comparison of the two central conditions indicates that the omniscient agency dramatically outperforms the original central condition on all of the previously reported measures. However, the omniscient agency only slightly outperforms the local condition in terms of levels of cooperation (61.8% to 58.4%) and mutual cooperation (2.7 to 2.5 mutual cooperation outcomes per subject per period). Average earnings are actually lower (179 to 184 E.C.U. per period), and none of these differences are statistically significant.
As expected, information requests in the truthful condition increase by 75% over the initial central condition, far exceeding even the requests in the local condition. Somewhat more surprisingly, selection and cooperation strategies are not much different than those analyzed for the original central condition; we do not report the regression results because of the similarity.
The impact per recommendation on selection is actually lower in the central truthful condition, but the larger number of available recommendations apparently accounts for the much higher observed number of links.
In short, even with the complete elimination of the information provision dilemma, central mechanisms fall far short of social optimality and do not improve upon the local condition. One clue about the disappointing performance is suggested by the variability in results across the two additional sessions reported in Table 5 , which reports aggregate statistics per subject per period for all sessions. The last central truthful session dramatically outperforms the best session in all other conditions, while the first central truthful session did little better than the modal baseline session. The same variability is observable in the initial central condition,
with sessions 3 and 4 providing over twice the earnings of sessions 1 and 2. In the baseline condition, only one outlier session exceeded the others by 60%, and in the local condition the outlier was less than 30% higher. The number of sessions is not sufficient to draw clear conclusions, but these patterns at least suggest that the greater availability of information in the central condition may increase the likelihood that initial expectations about cooperation will not be met, leading conditional cooperators to give up on others too soon. Outcomes for the central condition may therefore be much more contingent on initial settings than for the local condition, where slower information diffusion through clustered, overlapping linkages and stronger links between mutual cooperation and information provision provides a greater chance of reshaping the initial distribution of behavioral propensities-an important issue to be analyzed in a subsequent publication.
Conclusion
Our experiment has demonstrated the robust ability of local, emergent reputation mechanisms to enhance cooperation and to match or outperform centralized reputation mechanisms, at least in small group settings. The mechanism is very simple, requiring only that exchange partners in the underlying dilemma can ask their partners about others. Evidence supports our conjectures that the success of this mechanism involves the ability to tightly couple cooperation in the underlying game with the provision of information, a feature that is not present in either of the central mechanisms. Although performance falls far short of the socially optimal full-cooperation benchmark, the improved performance over the baseline condition with no shared information does illustrate the role of reputation in the development of a cooperative civil society. Direct participation in self-organizing local reputation systems, like direct participation in other localized institutions, appears to be a critical component in the development of mutual trust (Putnam 1993) and effective institutions (Ostrom and Nagendra 2006) .
The central reputation mechanism proves to be considerably more fragile and less effective than expected, despite the potential advantages of broadly communicating reputational information to everyone regardless of their network of contacts and thus encouraging new relationships to form between distant subjects that do not share a mutual contact. Although most information in our experiment is truthful, the central mechanism receives less information than the local condition and comparatively fewer people retrieve the information that is there; the mechanism even fails to increase cooperation over the no-information baseline. Nor is the central mechanism's problem limited solely to information provision, since even the fullinformation condition performs no better on average than the local condition and shows considerable variability across sessions. The problem of information credibility requires considerable attention (Brown and Morgan 2006) , which might explain why a successful reputation institution like eBay employs a large security staff and collaborates closely with governmental law enforcement to detect and punish cheaters. The observed fragility of our central mechanism suggests that operationally-successful central reputation institutions deserve considerable credit for resolving credibility and provision dilemmas that are not widely appreciated.
Centralized reputation institutions are likely to gain in importance in contemporary society to the extent that interactions increasingly expand to "strangers" outside the scope of existing local networks. Cooperation within the increasingly global scope of exchange and everexpanding scale of policy arenas is likely to depend increasingly on large-scale reputation mechanisms to signal relevant information about trustworthy partners for economic, political, and other types of exchange. If so, the problems of credibility and incentive-compatible information provision will pose the greatest challenge for institutions ranging from local partnerships through United Nations agencies as they attempt to enhance reputational effects and stimulate cooperative resolution of global challenges. The four-period limit was imposed due to space constraints on the computer screens used in the experiment, but it also reflects a bounded capacity to recall the past and process the information. Subjects are provided access to past outcomes without overwhelming them with the full sequence of play.
5
Our experimental design tries to make the costs of requesting and obtaining information as equal as possible across conditions. Given the intrinsic value of gossip in informal relationships, costs may be lower or even negative in naturally-occurring local settings, so the equality of costs in our design may actually favor the central condition. For the regressions reporting the number of CC links, the subject's proportion of cooperative choices in the first period is included as a control in later periods for any differences across treatments due to potential differences in the frequency of more cooperative subjects in any session. This proxy for the initial cooperative tendency of the subject did not alter the significant impact of the treatment.
7
We found no substantively important differences in the main conclusions reported here for several different specifications of the regression model. We will discuss the minor differences in the appropriate sections below.
8
Remember that even the punishment payoff provides a positive payoff as long as the subject plays less than 5 games in a given period, which accounts for the positive impact compared with no game at all. *Recommendations are provided immediately after each game outcome. C indicates cooperation, D indicates defection, and the recommender's choice in presented first-that is, CD indicates that the recommender cooperated and the recommended subject defected in the prior period, the situation in which vengeful negative recommendations would be most expected. 
